



University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons

Undergraduate Humanities Forum 2009-2010:
Connections

Penn Humanities Forum Undergraduate Research
Fellows

4-2010

Local Conflict, Global Intervention: The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force

Brandon Bloch

University of Pennsylvania, jbran@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2010

 Part of the [Arts and Humanities Commons](#)

Bloch, Brandon, "Local Conflict, Global Intervention: The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force" (2010). *Undergraduate Humanities Forum 2009-2010: Connections*. 5.
http://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2010/5

Suggested Citation:

Bloch, Brandon. (2010). "Local Conflict, Global Intervention: The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force." *2009-2010 Penn Humanities Forum on Connections*.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/uhf_2010/5
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Local Conflict, Global Intervention: The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force

Disciplines

Arts and Humanities

Comments

Suggested Citation:

Bloch, Brandon. (2010). "Local Conflict, Global Intervention: The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force." *2009-2010 Penn Humanities Forum on Connections*.

**Local Conflict, Global Intervention:
The Origins of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force**

Brandon J. Bloch

2009–2010 Penn Humanities Forum
Undergraduate Mellon Research Fellowship

Advisor: Prof. Ronald Granieri

1. Introduction: From Collective Security to International Peacekeeping

The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War on the dream that through cooperation, mutual respect, and if necessary, military intervention to block an aggressor, the international community could avoid plunging into another devastating war. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allied leaders Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin envisioned a system of collective security for the postwar, by which the three Great Powers would cooperate to quell a breach of the peace in any part of the world.¹ The collective security paradigm was embedded into the Charter of the United Nations, which charged five Great Powers, France and China added to the Allied victors, with the primary responsibility for carrying out the principal mandate of the UN, “to maintain international peace and security.”² Each of the Great Powers maintained the power of veto within the UN Security Council, such that unanimous agreement among them was required for the body to act.

The Charter’s collective security system, however, faltered at the inception of the United Nations, and its breakdown became one of the fateful stories of the early Cold War. As the East-West divide became entrenched, the Soviet Union relied increasingly on its veto power to thwart Western interests in the Security Council, undercutting the hope for cooperation among the Great Powers.³ Given that the United States and the Soviet Union would never collaborate on any security matter vital to the interests of either power, there emerged over the first decade of the United Nations several new modes of international conflict management that avoided the need for military cooperation among the Great Powers. In May 1948, responding to hostilities between a newly created Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Security Council authorized the

¹ Sakasena 30-1

² UN Charter Article 1

³ Kennedy, 52-3

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which would become the first peace observation mission. UNTSO consisted of several hundred lightly armed troops, under the command of UN Mediator Folke Bernadotte, charged to observe the compliance of Israel and the Arab states with the Armistice Agreements which had set the demarcation lines between the warring parties. However, the peace observers were instructed to remain neutral and could only report breaches of the Armistice lines to the equally ineffective Mixed Armistice Commissions; were violence to break out, the observers were instructed to step aside.⁴ As an opposite means of United Nations involvement, the Security Council authorized a military intervention during the Korean War, calling upon Member States to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. However, the enabling resolution for the operation was only passed due to the Soviet Union's boycott of Security Council meetings. In practice, the intervention in Korea became a United States military operation, established only under the guise of the United Nations.⁵

The Suez crisis of October 1956 marked a pivotal point in the role of the United Nations in maintaining international security, and led to the inception of peacekeeping as an innovative and effective paradigm. Relations between Egypt and the West had become strained since the rise to power of Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, whose strong nationalist sentiments and close ties to the Soviet Union elicited the fear of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Nasser sparked an international crisis when in July 1956, when after the United States and Britain had withdrawn funding for the Aswan High Dam project, he nationalized the Suez Canal, previously under the ownership of the privately held Suez Canal Company. Eden immediately favored a military intervention in Egypt, as a means to protect British interests in the Canal and to depose of Nasser, while Dulles and President Eisenhower

⁴ Ghali 84-91

⁵ Kennedy 56, Goodrich and Rosner 416

rejected a military solution. The British chose to proceed without the support of the United States; following a series of ostensible diplomatic maneuvers, by which the British and French proposed a power-sharing arrangement that Nasser readily rejected, Britain and France formed a covert pact with Israel in order to regain control of the Canal.⁶

On October 29, the Israeli military invaded the Sinai Peninsula, motivated by the imperative to advance its own security position against terrorist raids from Egypt. The following day, as planned, the British and French issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, demanding that both withdraw their militaries within a ten-mile radius of the Canal and allow Anglo-French troops to temporarily occupy the Canal zone. Naturally, Nasser rejected the ultimatum, which demanded that Egypt relinquish its authority to defend its own territory, and on October 31 the British and French commenced a bombing campaign over Egyptian territory. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld brought the crisis before the Security Council on October 30, whereby the United States proposed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Anglo-French-Israeli forces. Britain and France vetoed the resolution, as well as a subsequent, less extensive resolution put forth by the Soviet Union, ensuring that the Security Council could not fulfill its mandate to maintain international security.⁷ Immobilized, the Security Council voted to transfer the Suez question to the General Assembly under the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution,⁸ by which an urgent security matter could be transferred to the Assembly were a permanent member to block action in the Security Council.⁹

The Assembly faced a daunting challenge, on which hinged the reputation of the United Nations. Never before had the Assembly been called upon to consider a matter of immanent

⁶ Ghali 106-8

⁷ Sakasena 173-5

⁸ *ibid* 177

⁹ UNGA Res. 377 (V)

security; and further, two of the aggressors were members of the very elite group entrusted with the maintenance of international peace. The Assembly did not have the authority under the Charter to authorize military enforcement actions against the aggressors, and the United States would not condone an operation against its allies; but peace observation had failed to provide any stability in the Middle East over the previous eight years and could not serve as viable model now that hostilities had again flared. Over the course of a ten-day Emergency Special Session and through a series of negotiations conducted by the Secretary-General, the Assembly created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first UN peacekeeping operation, which inaugurated the set of principles that have come to define peacekeeping as a paradigm.

Peacekeeping, broadly conceived, is a strategy by which a neutral international force is deployed to create a buffer zone between two hostile parties, with the consent of the country on whose territory the force is stationed, in order to supervise a previously concluded cease-fire. A peacekeeping mission lacks the invasive character of a military enforcement operation, which intervenes on a specific side of a conflict, but it has greater authority than a peace observation mission, in that it maintains a physical bulwark between the disputants.¹⁰ Historian Alan James distinguishes the model of peacekeeping by four characteristics: the personnel are of a military nature; they are of neutral status and may only shoot in self-defense; they are placed to “diffuse tensions in areas of crisis”; and the operation is established by a legitimate international body.¹¹ Several further principles came to distinguish peacekeeping as it was conceived during the Suez crisis, including the nonparticipation of the Great Powers, which would not risk an adversary’s involvement in a peacekeeping operation, and the nonpolitical nature of the operation, in the sense that the presence of the force would not be contingent on the negotiation of a long-term

¹⁰ McCoubrey and White 24

¹¹ cited in Hill and Malik, p. 15

political settlement. The core tenet of a peacekeeping operation became the consent of the host country on whose territory foreign troops would be stationed.

The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping during the formation of UNEF and to examine how United Nations leaders arrived at the basic principles that would come to define peacekeeping as a unique and viable paradigm for curtailing local conflicts. In particular, I seek to assess the relative importance of immediate politico-military considerations and long-term, precedential legal considerations in the establishment of the force. First, I consider the particular roles of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the Canadian delegate Lester Pearson, the most central diplomats in the formation of UNEF. Then, I discuss the development of the principles that came to define peacekeeping through a detailed examination of the Assembly's First Emergency Special Session and the Secretary-General's negotiations with the government of Egypt, covering the period through the deployment of the first UNEF troops in the Canal area. I conclude with a summary of the major trends during the formation of UNEF and a discussion of how a precedential framework for peacekeeping grew out of an operation formed largely *ad hoc*.

2. Hammarskjöld and Pearson: The Visionaries of Peacekeeping

Every account of the formation of UNEF regards two figures as central. Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden had assumed the post of Secretary-General in 1953 and became known for his diplomatic tact. Hammarskjöld had become involved in the Suez crisis in early October, when he worked with the British, French, and Egyptian governments to draft a Security Council resolution outlining six principles for resolving the dispute,¹² and he recognized that the reputation of the UN hinged on securing the cessation of violence in Egypt. On October 31,

¹² Jackson 434

Hammar skjöld announced before the Security Council his view that the Secretary-General must remain loyal to the principles embodied in the Charter, which transcend the policies of individual Member States, and he quickly gained the trust of the parties to the crisis.¹³ Ambassador Lester Pearson of Canada arrived in New York on November 1 and quickly became the leading proponent of an emergency international force.¹⁴ Pearson recognized the dangerous rift the crisis had opened between Britain and the United States;¹⁵ he sought a means to reconcile Canada's closest allies, as well as to enable Britain to save face and obtain a reasonable settlement to the Canal dispute.¹⁶

The official account of the formation of UNEF holds that the idea for an emergency international force was initially advanced by Ambassador Pearson, upon which the concept was brought to fruition by the extraordinary insight and tact of Secretary-General.¹⁷ While this description is true, it is critical to distinguish between the model of peacekeeping Pearson proposed and championed throughout the early debates and the framework actually established by Hammar skjöld. Though they worked closely, Pearson and Hammar skjöld personify the great tension that defined the formation of UNEF. Pearson throughout emphasized the precedential nature of the operation and the need to establish a system of foundational principles such that the paradigm of peacekeeping could be employed in future conflicts. Hammar skjöld remained a pragmatist, focused on the imminent political realities of the Suez crisis, and he consistently favored negotiation and compromise over asserting matters of broad principle. Ultimately Hammar skjöld established the force on an *ad hoc* basis, through days of talks with the parties to the conflict and potential contributors to the force, and his personal diplomacy forms much of the

¹³ Press Release SG/514; Sakasena 176.

¹⁴ Carroll 38

¹⁵ Carroll 12

¹⁶ Goodrich and Rosner 414

¹⁷ *The Blue Helmets* 49

story of the creation of UNEF. Throughout, however, he carried out his duties in opposition to the model of peacekeeping Pearson defended.

In seeking to create a force that could secure a cease-fire in Egypt and regain the prestige of the United Nations, Hammarskjöld was called upon to reconcile the demands of three competing blocs. The majority of Member States, backed by the critical support of the United States, sought to establish a force that would supervise a cessation of violence and a withdrawal of the invading powers, without offering political gains to the aggressors. While the focus of the General Assembly remained political, the Member States also sought to establish an adequate legal basis for their actions consistent with the principles, though not the letter, of the Charter.¹⁸ The Assembly's resolutions expanded the body's power beyond its Charter functions, sufficiently such as to create a neutral, quasi-military force, but without encroaching on the military enforcement functions of the Security Council. Hammarskjöld throughout viewed his own legal status as determined by the Assembly resolutions; the legal authority for his diplomacy and for the peacekeeping mission he created stemmed from the principles put forth by the Assembly.

Further, Hammarskjöld was forced to confront the demands of Britain, France, and Israel, which refused to comply immediately with the Assembly resolutions. The legal principles asserted by the Assembly were nonbinding, given that the Assembly has no authority to enforce its resolutions; thus, the demands of the aggressors forced Hammarskjöld to deviate from the conception of the Force as envisioned by the Assembly to conform to the reality of Anglo-French-Israeli intransigence. Pearson remained closer to the British position than to the American, so that while he remained most concerned with establishing a set of precedential

¹⁸ Goodrich and Rosner 417

principles for peacekeeping, he often found himself arguing against the legal framework that had been established by the Assembly.

Finally, and especially after the conclusion of the Emergency Special Session, Hammarskjöld carried out extensive negotiations with the government of Egypt, which harbored suspicions of a force composed of foreign powers stationed on its soil. Egypt ultimately possessed little choice in its decision to accept the force, as this presented the only means to ensure the withdrawal of Britain and France.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Egypt's demands, especially with regard to the issue of "consent," served to shape the principles on which UNEF would be founded.

3. The First Emergency Special Session

The First General Assembly Emergency Special Session, at which the basic structure of UNEF was determined, convened on the evening of November 1, amidst a tense political climate. Cold War tensions loomed large, as the Soviet Union had already threatened to intervene on the side of Egypt,²⁰ while the United States was forced to choose whether to support its Western allies or its few remaining friends in the Arab world. The concept of an international force to be stationed between the Egyptian and Israeli troops was first proposed by the British delegate Pearson Dixon, who sought to secure a political advantage for his country; but as British policy came under attack from the Assembly's third world majority and, more significantly, from the United States, the framework for a peacekeeping operation diverged significantly from its initial conception. The extended General Assembly session witnessed competing visions of what an international peacekeeping force would entail, which clashed with each other and ultimately

¹⁹ Rikhye 48-9

²⁰ Sakasena 176

had to be reconciled with the reality of the situation on the ground. The emergency session saw the inception of many of the principles that have come to define U.N. peacekeeping, as well as a dramatic expansion of the role of the Secretary-General and the Assembly itself.

The Opening Meetings: Beyond Charter Norms

As the 1956 Emergency Session was the first General Assembly convened under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly faced fundamental questions about the nature and scope of its authority as it sought to diffuse the violence. The first and most basic question to surface was that of the legal status of the parties involved. While the British and French delegates offered a specious defense of their countries' actions, it was quickly accepted by the majority that the invasion of the Sinai constituted an unprovoked act of aggression against a Member State, and that Egypt thereby possessed the legitimate right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Several delegates recognized the broader contexts of the crisis, including the failure of the United Nations over the previous eight years to work out a long term solution to the Middle East conflict and more immediately, the entitlement of the British and French to compensation for their loss of the Canal.²¹ However, as explicitly stated in Article 2 of the Charter, and in accordance with every principle presumed to govern the postwar international order, such conflicts were to be resolved peacefully and not through military aggression.²² The invasion of Egypt was unjustifiable, and, if condoned, would set a precedent for the use of force as a legitimate means for attaining political objectives.

Given that the invasion of Egypt constituted a breach of the peace, the Assembly possessed the right under the 1950 resolution to "[make] appropriate recommendations to

²¹ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 562nd plen. met, para. 30

²² 1st emerg. spec. sess., 562nd plen. mtg, para. 34

Members for collective measures, including... the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”²³ However, the extent of the Assembly’s authority in responding to the present crisis was not immediately obvious. The Arab bloc, backed by the Soviet Union, maintained the most extreme position, arguing for the explicit condemnation of the invading forces and the application of sanctions against Israel. Ambassador Rafik Asha of Syria argued for the application of compulsory military force if the aggressors failed to comply with a resolution of the Assembly.²⁴ However, the Arab position conflicted with the legal parameters of the situation. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the Security Council has the authority to authorize the use of force against an aggressor, so neither compulsory force nor sanctions could be legally adopted as means to end the violence.²⁵ Ultimately the general view was accepted that the Assembly did not have the authority to mandate the use of force or sanctions against the aggressors, outside the legitimate right to self-defense of Article 51, and that the Assembly would not seek to condemn them.

However it was clear that some action, if not compulsory, had to be taken in response to the crisis. The most contentious debate during the early negotiations centered on whether the Assembly would only seek an end to the immediate violence, or whether the Assembly would take action to advance a political solution to the underlying tensions that had caused the crisis. Three general views were expressed on this question, divided along political lines. The Arab-Asian and Soviet blocs offered the narrowest interpretation of the Emergency Session’s mandate, holding that its only purpose was to bring about an immediate end to the violence in Egypt. These delegates argued that the long-term security situation of the Middle East was irrelevant to the present task of the Assembly. Rather, they held that the British, French, and Israelis should

²¹UNGA Res. 377 (V)

²⁴ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 562nd plen. mtg, paras. 40-57

²⁵ UN Charter Article 43

be condemned by the United Nations, and they discounted any Egyptian responsibility for the crisis. Most of the Latin American countries, and eventually the United States, emphasized that the United Nations was responsible not only for quelling the immediate violence, but for also for helping the parties to reach a long-term settlement. However, this group believed that it would only make sense to consider the long-term questions after the situation on the ground had stabilized, and thus it saw the securing of a cease-fire as the distinctive priority of the Emergency Session. Finally, Britain, France, and the former British Commonwealth states held that the imperative for a long-term security arrangement could not be divorced from the current emergency, so any UN action should contain measures that would facilitate a settlement to long-term political questions. Eden believed that the current crisis had arisen out of years of instability, and that the Anglo-French intervention might lead to a permanent Arab-Israeli settlement and an international agreement on the use of the Canal.²⁶ Dixon argued at the Assembly that given the inability of the United Nations over the previous eight years to bring about a stable situation in the Middle East, another round of ineffectual resolutions would be “of temporary value at best” and would only delay the next Arab-Israeli war.²⁷ Pearson, accepting the British view, told the Assembly that the current crisis presented “the opportunity to link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement.”²⁸

In the most critical development of the crisis, the United States government chose to take the moderate stance, holding that peace should precede a long-term settlement, rather than the position of its West European allies. The decision of Eisenhower and Dulles has been attributed to aggravation with the governments of Britain, France, and Israel, which had defied their traditional deference to U.S. leadership by moving forward with the invasion without informing

²⁶ Eden 604-5

²⁷ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 561st plen. mtg, para. 110

²⁸ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 562nd plen. mtg, para. 304

Washington.²⁹ The U.S. leadership also feared driving the newly created Arab and Asian nations toward the Soviet Union,³⁰ and as such Dulles sought to preempt Soviet involvement in the conflict.³¹ The draft resolution Dulles brought before the Assembly, which would become Assembly Resolution 997, garnered the support of the majority of Member States and ensured that Britain's aims would not be realized. The U.S. resolution noted, without condemnation, that the actions of the invading powers were in violation of international law. It urged the immediate establishment of a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, and a halt on the movement of arms to the area of conflict, without prescribing steps toward a long-term political settlement. The only long-term provision of the Resolution urged that "steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal," and then only after a cease-fire had been reached.³²

As the United States sought only to curtail the actions of the aggressors, without advancing a political solution, the initial idea for an international force to intervene in the region came from within the British bloc. Eden first proposed the concept of United Nations police force before the House of Commons on November 2,³³ and Dixon and then Pearson brought the idea before the Assembly. As such, the force was initially conceived as an extension of British political aims. Eden hoped that an international force would inspire world confidence in the attainment of a lasting Arab-Israeli peace and permanent freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.³⁴ Dixon advanced the notion of an international police force by claiming that the British had intervened in Suez in the first place only to safeguard the Canal and the security of the region.³⁵ Thus the Anglo-French force already served as a type of peacekeeping operation

²⁹ Finer 367-395

³⁰ Sakasena 184

³¹ Ghali 106

³² 1st emerg. spec. sess., Res. 997

³³ Eden 605

³⁴ Eden 607

³⁵ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 561st plen. mtg, para. 99

between the hostile Egyptians and Israelis, and it could eventually be replaced by an international force.³⁶ Pearson, the most prominent proponent of an international operation at the Assembly session, argued that such a force would “keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.”³⁷

Pearson’s vision and persistence between the start of the crisis and the next Assembly meeting on November 3 led to the official proposal for an international force. Pearson composed a draft resolution, with the significant input of the U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge, which contained the idea of an emergency international force.³⁸ Pearson had obtained the support of Hammarskjöld, after Secretary-General had learned that British, French, and Israelis would not obey the exhortations of Resolution 997, as well as the support of the delegate from India, an influential member of the Arab-Asia bloc.³⁹ Pearson was forced to set aside his support for the British position, in order to advance a resolution that would remain consistent with U.S. policy and obtain the support of a majority in the General Assembly. Pearson’s draft resolution, which became Assembly Resolution 998, ignored long-term political questions, proposing an international force only to oversee compliance with the terms of Resolution 997. His resolution was followed by Resolution 999, proposed by nineteen Asian and Arab countries, which reiterated the call for a cease-fire and withdrawal. Thus, from its formal conception, UNEF was envisioned as an operation meant to ensure compliance with the terms already dictated by the Assembly; it was not itself to become a factor in shaping a long-term peace settlement, nor even to maintain security while such a settlement was negotiated.

³⁶ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 561st plen. mtg, para. 111

³⁷ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 562nd plen. mtg, para. 307

³⁸ Carroll 31

³⁹ Finer 405

The Canadian resolution represented a definitive shift away from the Charter spirit of collective security and the dream that the superpowers would collaborate to guard a new order of international peace. The peacekeeping force would not defend a Member State against an aggressor but would only “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities”⁴⁰ in accordance with the Assembly’s previous resolution. Moreover, the international force would operate “with the consent of the countries concerned,”⁴¹ although the nature of that consent was to become the most crucial point of contention during the establishment of the operation. The legality of such a force was not questioned, however, because the functions stipulated in the resolution remained short of the peace enforcement measures that could only be authorized by the Security Council, and because the United States and the Soviet Union both supported the narrower view of the emergency force. The pending question remained whether the authority of such a mission could extend beyond the vague and limiting terms of Resolution 998, and whether Britain and her allies still maintained sufficient political clout to continue to advance the idea of a long-range, politically-motivated operation.

Most importantly, the Canadian resolution entailed an expansion of the functions of the Secretary-General from the administrative role envisioned in the Charter to an active diplomatic role. Resolution 998 conferred upon the Secretary-General complete authority to set up the framework and parameters for the operation, and it requested that Hammarskjöld submit a plan within forty-eight hours for the establishment of an emergency international force. It would have become cumbersome and politically unfeasible to attempt to reach a consensus among Assembly members on matters of detail, while Hammarskjöld already commanded the trust of the global diplomatic community. Indeed, it has been argued that Resolution 998 was above all a statement

⁴⁰ 1st emerg. spec. sess., Res. 998

⁴¹ *ibid.*

of faith in the “objectivity and prestige” of Hammarskjöld, who was alone entrusted to organize a viable force.⁴²

Hammarskjöld’s Reports on the Force

In accordance with Resolution 998, Hammarskjöld presented his first report on the plan for an emergency international force on the evening of November 4, opening a new phase in the Emergency Special Session in which the principles of peacekeeping were formally inaugurated. The fourth paragraph of Hammarskjöld’s report, which would become the basis for Assembly Resolution 1000, established the basic terms on which UNEF would operate. General E.L.M. Burns, the Chief of Command of UNTSO, was appointed as chief of the emergency international force and charged to recruit officers and troops from Member States. The Secretary-General was to maintain administrative oversight over the mission.⁴³

Importantly, Hammarskjöld’s report specified that no permanent member of the Security Council be permitted to submit troops for the force; the force would be comprised of middle and smaller powers only. This foundational principle originated in part from the politics of the Suez crisis and in part from the larger contexts of the Cold War. Both the American and Soviet governments rejected British and French participation in the force, consistent with their rejection of the Anglo-French position throughout the crisis. Thus, Hammarskjöld was able to proceed with his view of a politically independent force by prohibiting the participation of the parties to the conflict. Moreover, U.S. leaders feared that Soviet participation would shift the tenuous balance of influence in the Middle East, especially as the Eastern bloc had already been engaged

⁴² Sakasena 182

⁴³ A/3289

in arms deals with Nasser since September 1955.⁴⁴ Finally, the Soviet government itself, preoccupied with anti-communist demonstrations in Hungary, remained wary of becoming embroiled in a Middle East conflict.⁴⁵ The shift to peacekeeping by small powers, which was to become a basic model for future operations, represents a further departure from the collective security vision. A force comprised of contingencies from small powers was the only view that could be accepted by both superpowers, whose support was essential for the establishment of UNEF.

Hammar-skjöld's report also presented an important ambiguity as to the scope of the force. In discussing the basic parameters of the force, Hammar-skjöld recommended that the force be established to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of Resolution 997, restricting the functions of the force to the limited conception favored by the Arab-Asia bloc.⁴⁶ However, the report went on to distinguish between two stages of the force, a first stage corresponding to the functions outlined in Resolution 997, but a second stage corresponding to "efforts of a longer range."⁴⁷ Hammar-skjöld, then, did not seek to limit the functions of the emergency force, or to prematurely speculate on its functions in the long term. Ever a pragmatist, he preferred to quickly establish a viable force on the ground, and later to resolve the details of its eventual functions.

Finally, the Assembly debates on Hammar-skjöld's first report clarified the principle of consent, established in Resolution 998, which would become the critical factor distinguishing peacekeeping from peace enforcement. The Israeli delegate Abba Eban noted the failure of the Secretary's report to explicate the necessity of consent of the host country, fearing that the

⁴⁴ Ghali 106

⁴⁵ *ibid* 110-1

⁴⁶ A/3289, para. 4

⁴⁷ A/3289 para. 6

Assembly would be empowered to place an international force on Israeli territory without Israel's prior approval.⁴⁸ The Colombian delegate Francisco Urrutia responded that the consent of the host country was an obvious requirement of international law, unquestioned by any nation, but that the legitimate territory under jurisdiction of a sovereign state did not include that acquired by the use of force. The government of Israel could not claim sovereign status over the territory conquered in the invasion of the Sinai and could not legitimately deny a peacekeeping mission access to this territory.⁴⁹ Thus, the peacekeeping operation would not have the enforcement authority of Chapter VII measures, but if supported by the two great superpowers, it would not cower to the military acquisitions of an aggressor.

On the morning of November 7, after intensive consultations with Pearson and other delegates, the Secretary-General presented before the Assembly his second and final report on the plan for UNEF, approved later that day in Resolution 1001.⁵⁰ The Secretary-General remained cognizant that his authority to set up an international force was derived solely from the resolutions of the Assembly, and thus he based his proposals on the legal framework created by the four resolutions. The report envisioned a politically independent force, one that would derive its authority solely from the resolutions of the Assembly.⁵¹ This principle was not only necessary as a political measure, to prevent the force from becoming a subordinate of the invading powers, but also to uphold the principles of Resolution 998, which charged the Secretary-General, not a particular Member State, to submit a plan for the force. Most critically, Hammarskjöld's report rejected the Anglo-French proposal to assign responsibility for the force to a single country or

⁴⁸ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 565th plen. mtg, para. 42

⁴⁹ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 565th plen. mtg, para. 90

⁵⁰ Rikhye 48

⁵¹ A/3302

small group of countries, which would carry out the purposes of the United Nations; rather, the force and its commander would be responsible directly to the Assembly.⁵²

The Secretary-General's second report also reopened the question of the scope of the operation. Britain and her allies continued to view the UN force as an operation which would take over the functions of the present Anglo-French "peacekeeping" mission, and would remain in the area until settlements for the Palestine and Canal questions were reached. Thus, Pearson pressed the view that the force should remain in the region while a political settlement was worked out, hoping to move directly from a cease-fire to a negotiation process.⁵³ Dixon and Ambassador Leslie Munro of New Zealand argued that the Anglo-French troops could not withdraw from Egypt until the international force was firmly in place, on account that Egypt-Israeli violence could again break out and threaten the Canal.⁵⁴

Over the course of the meeting, however, the arguments of Britain and its allies were countered by the small powers, which echoed the Secretary-General in urging strict limitations on the functions and scope of the force. Two problems with the British interpretation emerged: first, that the international force would be authorized to remain in Egypt indefinitely, until a political settlement was reached; and second, that the Anglo-French force would not withdraw from Egyptian territory until after the international force was established. In regard to the first problem, a force whose mission was to provide security during political negotiations could too easily become "an instrument, directly or indirectly, for the accomplishment of political objectives of the parties [Britain and France] to the controversy in the area."⁵⁵ The smaller powers feared that any objective of the international force other than the restoration of the *status*

⁵² A/3302 para. 5

⁵³ 1st. emerg. spec. sess., 566th plen. mtg, paras. 25-28

⁵⁴ 1st. emerg. spec. sess., 567th plen. mtg, paras. 86, 103

⁵⁵ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 566th plen. mtg, para. 81

quo ante would entail gains for Britain, France, and Israel, thereby legitimating aggression as a means to achieving political objectives.⁵⁶

The view of a force with narrow objectives was supported by the basic legal framework established by the Assembly's resolutions and confirmed in the Secretary-General's report:

“A closer analysis of the concept of the United Nations force, based on what the General Assembly has stated in its resolution on the matter [Resolution 998] indicates that the Assembly intends that the force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict... By the establishment of the force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in [Resolution 997].”⁵⁷

Paragraph 12 of the report, on “Questions of Functions,” also explicated that the force would have no rights outside the terms of Resolution 997.⁵⁸ The delegate from Sweden argued that as Resolution 997 did not discuss a political settlement to the Suez question, it followed that the Force should not remain in Egypt “pending the solution of political problems affecting that area.”⁵⁹

The smaller powers further maintained that an operation established on the premise of the contingent withdrawal of the Anglo-French force would violate the sovereign rights of Egypt. These countries emphasized that British and French possessed no legal right to their presence on Egyptian territory, regardless of whether a peacekeeping force had been established.⁶⁰ Despite the burgeoning power of the Assembly, which in effect found itself in the process of creating its own legal regime, the majority of the small powers remained focused on the sovereign rights of Egypt.

⁵⁶ 1st. emerg. spec. sess., 567th plen. mtg, para. 153

⁵⁷ A/3302, para. 8

⁵⁸ A/3302, para. 12

⁵⁹ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 566th plen. mtg, para. 66

⁶⁰ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 567th plen. mtg, para. 250

However, while the smaller powers could press the notion of a narrowly-conceived force against the more expansive claims of the British block, their arguments ultimately clashed with the reality of the Anglo-French-Israeli presence at Sinai. The invading powers refused to withdraw immediately on the demands of the Assembly, as Eden did not take seriously the Soviet military threat and wished to complete the operation that had been begun.⁶¹

Hammar skjöld had sent letters to all four parties to the conflict immediately following the passing of Resolution 999,⁶² urging them to implement a cease-fire within twelve hours, but as of the deadline he had received a reply only from the government of Egypt, which accepted a cease-fire on the condition that it was recognized by the other powers. On November 5 the governments of Britain and France sent letters to Hammar skjöld, stating that their militaries would continue to operate in Egypt with “strictly limited objectives” until both Egypt and Israel expressed their willingness to accept an international peacekeeping force.⁶³ Following a run on sterling, the British Cabinet finally agreed to a cease-fire on midnight of November 6-7, the only condition on which the U.S. government would support an IMF loan.⁶⁴ France followed suit,⁶⁵ but the three invading powers remained on Egyptian territory with no a commitment to withdraw.

The intransigence of Britain, France and Israel posed a significant obstacle to the creation of a peacekeeping force. On the one hand, the stated purpose of the force was to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities,”⁶⁶ namely by ensuring the withdrawal of the British and French from Egypt and the withdrawal of the Egyptian and Israeli forces behind the armistice

⁶¹ J. Pearson 161

⁶² Resolution 999 reinforced the provisions of Resolution 997 and urged the parties to immediately agree to a cease-fire and withdraw behind the armistice lines. The Secretary-General was authorized to request the compliance of the involved parties and to report on the implementation of the Resolution.

⁶³ A/3293, A/3294

⁶⁴ J. Pearson 161-2

⁶⁵ A/3307

⁶⁶ Res. 1000

lines. However, neither the Assembly nor any peacekeeping force created under its auspices possessed the Chapter VII authority to force the invading powers to withdraw from Egypt. The smaller powers differed widely in their approaches to this problem. The delegate from Brazil ascribed to Pearson's view that the invading powers should not be expected to withdraw from Egypt until the international force had been established on the ground. The delegate from Denmark recommended proceeding with the establishment of the force, relying on the good faith of the powers that they would withdraw as soon as they were able. The Arab-Asia block argued that the international force should not be deployed until after the United Nations had received the "immediate and unconditional assurance"⁶⁷ from Israel that it would comply with the Assembly resolutions. Ultimately, however, the Arab-Asia position was untenable; given the limitations of the Assembly's legal authority, Hammarskjöld chose to proceed with the creation of the force, without a promise of Anglo-French-Israeli withdrawal, and the Arab-Asia bloc tacitly acquiesced to this reality in its acceptance of the enabling resolutions.

Despite the sharp disagreement over the role of the force, the necessity of a peacekeeping operation itself was widely accepted among Assembly members, evident in the near unanimous adoption of Resolutions 1000 and 1001. The idea of a quasi-military operation authorized by the Assembly was only called into question once, by Ambassador Kuzentov of the Soviet Union, who disputed the legality of the operation on two grounds. First, only the Security Council, under Chapter VII, had the authority to organize any type of military force for the maintenance of international security; and second, the only legitimate type of UN force, under Chapter VII, was one that would intervene to defend a Member State against external aggression.⁶⁸ That no delegate answered Kuzentov's objection signifies the one point on which nearly all of the

⁶⁷ 1st. emerg. spec. sess., 566th plen. mtg, para. 58

⁶⁸ 1st emerg. spec. sess., 566th plen. mtg, para. 292

Member States agreed. Such a literal reading of the Charter could not stand in the way of immediate and effective action, necessary to restore the prestige of the United Nations; acting outside the letter of the Charter was acceptable, so long as the Assembly did not act directly in conflict with its provisions. No nation had objected when Hammarskjöld spoke of the legal situation “*created*” by the General Assembly [my italics].⁶⁹ It was futile for the Soviet delegate to object to the legality of the law created by the Assembly after political necessity and majority opinion had concurred in this process.

Ultimately, the Emergency Session established the rudimentary outlines of the future peacekeeping operation and established the basic parameters for the debate over its functions. Due primary to clashing political interests, the Member States had not arrived at conclusive answers on most of the critical questions by the time the session closed on November 10. The force was approved by a wide majority of Member States in view of the urgency of the matter. The language of the resolutions--for example, that a peacekeeping operation should be set up with “the consent of the nations concerned”⁷⁰ or that the aggressors should withdraw from Egypt “immediately”⁷¹--was sufficiently vague that states of varying political interests could vote in favor of the measures based on their own preferred interpretations. Questions about the meaning of “consent” and “territorial sovereignty” within the context of an international peacekeeping mission would again be raised during the Secretary-General’s negotiations with the government of Egypt, when a clearer understanding of the role of a peacekeeping operation would be reached.

⁶⁹ for example, A/3302 and 1st emerg. spec. sess., 565th plen. mtg, para. 47

⁷⁰ 1st emerg. spec. sess., Res. 998

⁷¹ 1st emerg. spec. sess., Res. 999

4. Negotiations with Egypt

With the acceptance of Resolution 1001, the basic principles on which the UNEF would be created had been confirmed. The UNEF was to function as a buffer force that would “ensure compliance” with the terms of Resolution 997, without military or political objectives, and its presence depended on the consent of Egypt.⁷² However, the government of Egypt requested clarification on certain points before it would accept an international force on its territory, and after Resolution 1001 was passed, Hammarskjöld and Burns engaged in a week of intensive negotiations with Egyptian officials. The Secretary’s primary goal during these negotiations was to establish a sufficiently strong relationship with the government of Egypt such that the first contingencies of UNEF troops could be deployed as soon as possible. He discounted broad principles in favor of setting up a force that could actually prove effective in securing the withdrawal of the non-Egyptian troops and providing a basis for peace in the region.

The central problem encountered during the first round of negotiations was to define the Egyptian “consent” which, according to the Secretary-General’s second report, was to serve as the basis for the stationing and operation of a UN force in Egypt.⁷³ It was unclear what “consent” would mean in a situation in which foreign troops were to operate on the territory of a sovereign nation, if these troops were not to become subsumed into that country’s own army or to fight against it. Over the course of the negotiations, Hammarskjöld did not arrive at a general definition of “consent,” but rather reached a series of practical arrangements with Egypt such that the first troops of UNEF could be deployed by November 15.

The first question to arise was whether UNEF would have any functions in the Port Said area, around the Suez Canal, after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces. On November 9

⁷² Sakasena 186

⁷³ A/3302, para. 9

Nasser expressed his fear that after the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, UNEF might occupy part of the Canal zone “to allow the internationalization of the Canal,” hence serving as an instrument of British policy.⁷⁴ His concern was augmented by paragraph 4 of the Assembly’s Resolution 997, which urged that “steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation.”⁷⁵ However, Hammarskjöld reassured the government of Egypt that the functions of the force would remain limited to the supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal. His own report on UNEF, which had been confirmed by the Assembly as the basis for the force, only referred to these two functions,⁷⁶ while the Assembly’s initial resolution on November 2 had been drafted before the idea of an international force had been discussed. UNEF would always patrol the border between Egypt and Israel, and when that border shifted from the Canal region to the Armistice lines, the placement of UNEF would shift as well.⁷⁷

A more contentious question centered on the authority to determine the composition of the force. While the Assembly had given Hammarskjöld and Burns the authority to recruit officers directly from Member States outside the permanent members of the Security Council,⁷⁸ Nasser asserted that Egypt’s consent was required for every Member State that was to contribute to the force, as an extension of Egypt’s consent for the presence of the force itself.⁷⁹ Nasser objected to the proposed participation of NATO members Denmark and Norway, and in particular to the participation of Canada, a staunch British ally. Hammarskjöld continued to assert in principle his legal right to determine the composition of the force, but he recognized that in practice, a force whose contingents were not accepted by Egypt would not be politically

⁷⁴ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, p. 3

⁷⁵ 1st emerg. spec. sess., Res. 997, para. 4

⁷⁶ A/3302 paras. 8, 12

⁷⁷ Aide Memoire on the Basis for Arrival of UNEF In Egypt, 19 November 1956

⁷⁸ Res. 1000, para. 3

⁷⁹ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, p. 5

tenable. Thus the Secretary-General wrote in an aide-memoir to Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi that he intended “to work out the composition on the basis of a negotiated agreement with Egypt.”⁸⁰ By November 12, Hammarskjöld and the government of Egypt had agreed to the participation of Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia,⁸¹ a group which represented a balanced set of perspectives on the Suez conflict. The question of Canada was resolved when General Burns offered to deploy a non-infantry unit, which was acceptable to the Egyptians.⁸²

A final question regarding the definition of “consent” arose as to the length of UNEF’s presence in Egypt. In a November 11 meeting with Hammarskjöld, the Egyptian delegate Omar Loutfi maintained that as Egypt’s consent was required for the “entry and presence” of UNEF, the force could be withdrawn at any time on Egypt’s demand.⁸³ This extension of Egyptian consent posed a problem for the Secretary-General, as it seemed contradictory to establish a force charged by the Assembly to fulfill certain tasks, which could be withdrawn on Egypt’s demand before those tasks were fulfilled. Hammarskjöld proposed a negotiation principle similar to his solution to the question of composition: were Egypt and the UN unable to agree on whether the tasks of UNEF had been completed, the Secretary-General would engage in negotiations with Egypt to determine when the force could be withdrawn.⁸⁴ When the Egyptian government challenged that the requirement of such negotiations would compromise its sovereign rights, the Secretary-General responded that constitutionally, Egypt retained the right to demand the withdrawal of UNEF at any time. The Secretary-General retained only the

⁸⁰ Aide Memoire from the Secretary-General to Dr. Fawzi, 12 November 1956

⁸¹ Incoming code cable from General Burns to the Secretary-General, 12 November 1956

⁸² Ghali 117

⁸³ Aide Memoire from the Secretary-General, 11 November 1956

⁸⁴ Aide Memoire from the Secretary-General to Dr. Fawzi, 12 November 1956

absolute right to bring such a matter before the Assembly.⁸⁵ However, Hammarskjöld maintained that the idea of negotiations between Egypt and the UN should be asserted as a normative principle, if UNEF was to fulfill its purpose.

The UNEF Advisory Committee, a group of seven nations established by Resolution 1001 to assist Hammarskjöld in the formation of the force, met for the first time on November 14, two days after Hammarskjöld formally announced that Egypt had accepted the presence of UNEF on its territory. The debate in the meeting centered on the nature of Egyptian “consent” and ultimately served to strengthen the Secretary-General’s position. As during the negotiations, Hammarskjöld held that respect for Egyptian sovereignty must serve as the foundation for all questions, and that any disagreement between Egypt and the UN would ideally be resolved through negotiations. Hammarskjöld’s pragmatic position followed from his primary goal of establishing an international force as a “*fait accompli*.”⁸⁶ It would be impossible to resolve all matters of principle in advance, let alone to foresee all those that may arise in the future; Hammarskjöld believed it wiser to first establish a force on the ground, and then to resolve the conditions for its presence through negotiations, once the realities of the situation became clear. Hammarskjöld’s position was supported by the delegates from India and Ceylon. They insisted that as UNEF had been set up by the Assembly for an *ad hoc* purpose, the force should be established in consistence with its pragmatic aims. Overriding legal principles could only develop over time, through negotiations between the UN and Egypt.⁸⁷

Throughout the meeting Pearson remained opposed to Hammarskjöld’s position, underscoring the difference in outlook of the principal creators of UNEF. Pearson expressed his mistrust of the Egyptian government and his fear that were UNEF to fail, states in the future

⁸⁵ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 9-10

⁸⁶ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, p. 16

⁸⁷ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, p. 17-26

would not look to the UN to resolve security crises. He objected to Egypt's asserted rights to determine "all the powers and functions" of the force, to demand the withdrawal of the force at any time, and to hold a veto power over any participating contingent. Once the government of Egypt had accepted the Assembly resolutions which had established the force, Pearson argued, it must also accept the right of the Assembly and the Secretary-General to organize a force consistent with those resolutions, without seeking to interfere for its own political advantage. Pearson further emphasized the "international character" of the force, in response to Nasser's objection that a Canadian contingent would sympathize with the British position.⁸⁸ Legal scholar Rosalyn Higgins argued that Pearson's argument was the more reasonable: if Egypt had consented to the entry of a force that was charged to fulfill specific functions, then it was consistent to expect that Egypt consent to the presence of the force until those functions were completed.⁸⁹

Ultimately, however, Pearson's desire to delimit boundaries on Egyptian authority was not accepted by the Advisory Committee. Nasser remained skeptical about the idea of a neutral international force, while international public opinion viewed Egypt a victim state. Moreover, the Assembly resolutions and the stance generally adopted during the Assembly debates, which was unequivocal as to the sovereign rights of Egypt, gave legal credence to the Egyptian position.⁹⁰ Hammarskjöld's negotiation principle served as a means of reconciling two opposing political realities: that Egypt would continue to assert its rights over the control of UNEF, and that the Assembly would need to maintain a certain authority so that the international force did not become an Egyptian force staffed by foreigners, as Pearson worried.

⁸⁸ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 14-16, 20

⁸⁹ Higgins 21

⁹⁰ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 1-2

With the arrival of fifty Norwegian and forty-five Danish UNEF troops on November 15, Hammarskjöld felt it necessary to personally visit Egypt, both to demonstrate his good faith and to discuss unresolved issues. Aware of the novel character of the first “truly international force” in human history, Hammarskjöld wanted to ensure that the deployment of the force proceeded smoothly.⁹¹

Hammarskjöld remained in Egypt from the 16th until the 18th of November. His talks with representatives of the government of Egypt resolved few matters of principle; in fact, the Secretary-General produced a text listing many critical points, including the composition of the force and the area to be covered by the force after Israeli withdrawal, as matters to be left for future negotiations.⁹² The only real principle agreed upon was that the UNEF “cannot stay nor operate unless Egypt continues its consent,” essentially a formalization of the tenet Hammarskjöld had recognized during the first round of negotiations with Egypt.⁹³

The Secretary-General had never intended to come to a concrete legal arrangement with Egypt. Rather, he believed that “moral and political forces” would ultimately determine the success of UNEF and that it was most critical to strengthen the relationship between the UN and Egypt. On November 19, Hammarskjöld presented to the Advisory Committee an “Aide-Memoire on the Basis for the Presence and Functioning of UNEF in Egypt” which he had arranged with Egypt during his visit. The “good faith” agreement, as it has subsequently become known, was approved by the Assembly on November 24 and served as the basis for the presence of UNEF in Egypt until a more concrete legal regime was arrived at in February.⁹⁴ The agreement held that in all matters “concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF,” Egypt

⁹¹ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 26-8

⁹² Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 19 November 1956, pp. 4-5

⁹³ Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 19 November 1956, p. 5

⁹⁴ Goodrich and Rosner 425

would be guided “in good faith” by its acceptance of the Assembly resolutions that had established the force; similarly, the UN would be guided “in good faith” by the tasks assigned to the force by the Assembly resolutions. Most importantly, the UN and Egypt would “explore jointly” the logistical aspects of the operation and would implement the guiding principles of the Assembly resolutions.⁹⁵

The “good faith” agreement represents the culmination of Hammarskjöld’s pragmatic diplomacy during the initial phase of the Suez crisis. It would not have been politically feasible for Hammarskjöld to force the government of Egypt to accept specific logistical arrangements without prior consultation, as it would have been antithetical to the neutral character of the mission for Egypt itself to direct the operation. The “good faith” agreement represented a viable middle ground between these extremes, as neither Egypt nor the Assembly could unilaterally impose its own terms, and both would seek to resolve areas of tension with an understanding of the other’s good will.

5. Conclusions

Hammarskjöld’s vigorous response to the challenges of the Suez crisis brought to fruition a novel model for international peacekeeping, which would prove of great significance in the subsequent history of the UN. Through two weeks of intensive negotiations, we see a series of foundational principles emerge in response to the tensions of the early Cold War: the noninvolvement of the Great Powers from the mutual fear of the United States and the Soviet Union of the other’s participation in the force; the concept of a neutral force, not contingent on a political settlement, from protracted debates within the General Assembly ultimately resolved in accordance with the view of the United States; and the principle of the “consent” of the host

⁹⁵ A/3375 add.

country from the clashing demands of Pearson and the Egyptian government, ultimately resolved through Hammarskjöld's diplomacy. These principles remained ambiguous even upon the arrival of the first troops, but the good faith established between Egypt and the United Nations would serve to guide UNEF as it evolved over the following months. The support of the international community remained behind the innovative paradigm, which had steered the world from a potential Great Power confrontation and had brought at least a temporary peace following one of the most precarious conflicts since the Second World War.

The imperative for a firmer legal basis for peacekeeping was not forgotten, even after the remarkable experience of UNEF. Pearson remained concerned that such a pragmatic *ad hoc* success might be difficult to repeat, and thus he proposed that the UN develop an “organized and permanent” mechanism for peacekeeping to be applied in future conflict situations. He feared that without such a system countries would look to regional security organizations, dominated by the political interests of the Great Powers, for protection against aggressors, and thereby the United Nations would become defunct. However, the more permanent peacekeeping framework Pearson proposed mirrored the structure of UNEF, attesting to the precedential nature of the principles established during the Suez crisis despite that they arose in response to a specific political situation. Thus, Pearson proposed that non-permanent Member States be asked in advance whether they would provide a military contingent for a future peacekeeping force, upholding the principle of the non-involvement of the Great Powers. He proposed that a general agreement on the “financial, administrative, and legal procedures” of a Peace Supervision Force be drawn up consistently with the principle of consent; consent for the force would be determined by agreement between the Secretary-General and the host country. Finally, Pearson

suggested that in any future peacekeeping operation the Secretary-General be provided with an Advisory Committee and a Military Advisor, mimicking the structure of UNEF.⁹⁶

Ultimately, it was Hammarskjöld's remarkable ability to balance the competing demands of the three major blocs that ensured the successful establishment of UNEF; Pearson's vision of a rigorous set of principles was not realized, and the rules that would govern the mission emerged in response to Hammarskjöld's diplomatic calculations. However it is not a mere coincidence that the model derived *ad hoc* during the Suez crisis established a precedent for many future peacekeeping operations. The framework for peacekeeping created a paradigm that responded to the political realities of the Cold War and allowed a viable, albeit limited, security role for the international body, despite the antagonism of its two most powerful members. UNEF maintained the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, which enabled the UN to act in the preservation of international security so long as their own interests were not affected. Moreover, UNEF was founded on the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the host state, thereby avoiding an invasive military operation which could not win the combined support of the Great Powers and would endanger an escalation of the conflict. Peacekeeping operations diverged from the collective security envisioned by the Charter's framers, and they did not bring about final political resolutions to international disputes; but within the limitations imposed by Cold War, they could monitor a cease-fire and provide a significant moral force against a further escalation of violence. In successfully balancing Cold War tensions within the context of the Suez crisis, Hammarskjöld ultimately created a model that could remain viable given the broader security concerns and political instabilities of the time.

⁹⁶ L. Pearson, 395-404

Works Cited

Primary Sources:

General Assembly Documents:

- A/3289 First report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force requested in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956
- A/3293 Letter dated 5 November 1956 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, addressed to the Secretary-General
- A/3294 Letter dated 5 November 1956 from the Permanent Representative of the France, addressed to the Secretary-General
- A/3302 Second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force requested in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956
- A/3307 Letter dated 6 November 1956 from the Permanent Representative of France, addressed to the Secretary-General
- A/3375 add. Aide-Memoir for the Basis for Presence and Functioning of UNEF in Egypt

General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), “Uniting for Peace”

General Assembly, First Emergency Special Session:

Res. 997, 998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1002

Plenary Meetings 561st, 562nd, 563rd, 565th, 566th, 567th

Meetings of the Advisory Committee on UNEF: 14 November 1956, 19 November 1956

Miscellaneous:

Press Release SG/514, 31 October 1956

Documents from the Andrew Cordier Papers, Colombia University Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, Box #190, relating to Hammarskjöld’s negotiations with Egypt

Secondary Sources:

Michael K. Carroll (2009). *Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Anthony Eden (1960). *Full Circle*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

- Herman Finer (1964). *Dulles Over Suez*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Mona Ghali (1993). "United Nations Emergency Force I: 1956-1967." in *The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Ed. William J. Durch. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 104-130.
- (1993). "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948-Present." in *The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Ed. William J. Durch. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 84-103.
- Leland M. Goodrich and Gabriella E. Rosner (1957). "The United Nations Emergency Force." *International Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 3. pp. 413-430.
- Rosalyn Higgins (1963). *International Law and the U.N.* London: Oxford University Press.
- Elmore Jackson (1957). "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General." *International Organization*, Vol. 11 No. 3. pp. 431-445.
- Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik (1996). *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Paul Kennedy (2006). *The Parliament of Man*. New York: Random House.
- Hilaire Mccoubrey and Nigel D. White (1996). *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Jonathan Pearson (2003). *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez crisis*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lester Pearson (1957). "Force for U.N." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35 No. 3. pp. 395-404.
- Indarjit Rikhye (1984). *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- K.P. Sakasena (1974). *The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis*. Delhi: D.K. Publishing House.
- United Nations Department of Public Information (1985). *The Blue Helmets*. New York: United Nations.